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RESUMEN 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la naturaleza de las relaciones entre las compañías 
aseguradoras españolas y los agentes representantes que articularon las redes de 
distribución de seguro en España durante la primera mitad del siglo XX. Para ello, se ha 
recurrido a documentación de las principales compañías con el objetivo de examinar el 
marco de dichas relaciones, a saber: los diseños de los contratos de agencia, la 
negociación de las comisiones o las pautas de inspección y supervisión de la acción de 
los agentes. Utilizando el marco interpretativo de la teoría de la agencia, este trabajo 
pretende arrojar luz sobre las problemáticas y dinámicas que definieron la distribución 




The objective of this paper is to analyse the nature of the relationships between the main 
insurance companies in Spain and the agents who comprised the insurance distribution 
networks in this country during the first half of the twentieth century. To achieve this 
goal, we have gone through documentary sources from the main companies in order to 
examine the framework of these relationships, namely: the design of agency contracts, 
the negotiation of commissions and the guidelines for inspections and the supervision of 
agents. Using the framework of agency theory, this paper aims to enhance our 
understanding of the conflicts and dynamics that determined the distribution of such a 
complex financial product as insurance in a late development economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the introduction of new techniques and resources 
arriving from abroad and their adaptation to the specific characteristics of the Spanish 
economy fostered the expansion of the insurance market.
1
 The entry of foreign 
companies injected new capital into the sector, while access to international reinsurance 
networks provided the Spanish economy with subscription capacity and risk 
diversification services.
2
 The importation of actuarial instruments such as mortality 
tables enabled a more precise planning and design of companies’ risk portfolios, while 
also facilitating the spread of products associated to life insurance.
3
 At the same time, 
management and supervision techniques adapted from foreign companies contributed to 
consolidating the sector.
4
 One of the key elements in the growth of the business was the 
establishment of distribution networks adapted to the complex reality of the Spanish 
market. The need to come up with  forms of organisation that were flexible and able to 
provide coverage for large geographical areas with a very limited demand made the 
agency system a vital element in the consolidation of the market.
5
 Especially from the 
turn of the century onwards, insurance companies had to find and train independent 
agents who were capable of creating a client portfolio and maintaining it over time.  
Certainly, while during the nineteenth century insurers had focused on the main 
Spanish cities, the growth in market potential beyond Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao and 
Malaga opened up new horizons for the sector. The business opportunities in smaller 
provincial capitals and small developing cities led to the establishment of extensive 
networks of agents to represent companies. Within this context, the Spanish insurance 
                                                          
1
 Frax and Matilla (1996; 1998) and Pons (2002; 2003), among others, have commented on the growth of 
the market from the last third of the 19th century and, in particular, after the passage of the first general 
insurance legislation in 1908. 
2
 Pons (2005; 2007; 2008; 2010a; 2012) and Pearson (2010a) have highlighted the contribution of foreign 
companies to Spanish insurance, both in the form of the direct establishment of branch offices and 
through the acquisition of subsidiaries. For a case study of the Zurich group in Spain, see Pons (2015). 
Pearson (2010b) and Gutiérrez and Pons (2017a; 2017b) have emphasised the close links between 
Spanish insurance and the international reinsurance market. For an empirical analysis of the contribution 
of international reinsurance to the insurance sector in Spain, see Gutiérrez and Andersson (2017). 
3
 Pons and Gutiérrez (2016) have analysed the backwardness of actuarial techniques in Spain and have 
highlighted the use of foreign mortality tables as instruments for maximising profits, both by 
multinational companies and by Spanish insurers. 
4
 Pearson (2012) explores the pioneering nature of British insurance in terms of management and business 
organisation techniques, while Pons (2004; 2008; 2010b; 2012) analyses the influence of British 
companies not only on the internal organisation of the companies in Spain, but also on the forms of 
association and cartelisation of the market. 
5
 According to Carreras and Tafunell (2005: 484), in 1900, more than 67 per cent of the Spanish 
population continued residing in municipalities of less than 10,000 inhabitants, and more than 27 per cent 
lived in localities of less than 2,000 inhabitants, which meant that demand was very dispersed. 
3 
market became the scenario of competition, not only between agents to increase their 
portfolios, but also between insurers who sought the services of the producers who 
could perform best in local markets.
6
 These developments led to the creation of agency 
relationships between representatives and companies, embodied in increasingly 
complex and detailed contracts designed to protect the positions of both parties. 
Moreover, the dynamics of the insurance market itself encouraged the development, on 
the basis of representatives directly linked to companies, of extensive subcontracting 
networks that contributed to channelling the supply in extensive Spanish regions.
7
 Far 
from being established as homogeneous practices, insurance companies focused their 
distribution strategies in very different ways: mutual and joint-stock companies revealed 
different dynamics that were reflected in both their results and their distribution costs.
8
 
This form of organisation would enable the market to be extended to the vast Spanish 
rural world much before the introduction and spread of the branch system from the 
1920s. 
In view of all the above, the aim of this paper is to analyse the nature and 
performance of insurance distribution networks within the framework of agency theory, 
paying special attention to the selection of agents, contract conditions, network control 
systems, conflicts and the costs of the relationships between companies and agents. To 
this end, the second section analyses the evolution of distribution systems in Spain from 
the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, contrasting their effects on 
the main indicators of the Spanish insurance market. The third section analyses the 
distribution strategies implemented by a foreign insurer from the planning stage of its 
entry into Spain until the consolidation of a network of sub-agencies during the 
nineteenth century. The fourth section explores two cases of mixed production 
networks: the case of the Mutua General de Seguros and the interactions between 
agencies and branches, and the Zurich-Hispania pairing and the institution of shared 
                                                          
6
 According to the figures for contributors in the Estadística sobre la Contribución de Utilidades de la 
Riqueza Mobiliaria (ECURM), there were 301 external agents of insurance companies registered in Spain 
in 1901; whereas just three decades later, in 1932, this figure had risen to 5,820. See ECURM, Years 1901 
and 1932. 
7
 For example, in the case of Andalusia, there were 74 registered insurance agents in 1932: however, far 
from being uniformly distributed, these were concentrated in the provinces of Cordoba (14), Seville (30) 
and Malaga (30). The rest of the territory depended directly on auxiliary networks of these sales agents. 
See ECURM, 1932. 
8
 Regan and Tennyson (1996; 2000) and Regan (1997) have analysed the repercussions of the form of 
organisation on distribution costs and the final choice between exclusive or independent agents. 
4 
distribution networks within a foreign insurance group in Spain. Finally, some general 
conclusions are added. 
 
2. Distribution systems in the Spanish insurance market 
Insurance companies use different mechanisms to distribute their products in the 
market. Insurers sell their policies through sales personnel employed directly by the 
company or through external agents, these latter either being contracted on an exclusive 
basis by a single company or working as independent sellers with agreements with 
different insurers.
9
 The choice of one method or another has important repercussions on 
the insurer’s results, as in the first case the information on customers belongs to the 
company, while in the other cases it belongs to the agent.
10
 Meanwhile, the relationship 
of the sales agent with the insurer entails different profiles in the selection and 
monitoring of the risks accepted and, consequently, in the company’s production costs. 
Moreover, research on business and portfolio management points to a direct relationship 
between the choice of the distribution system and firms’ different ownership structures. 
In this respect, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) indicate that the use of independent agents 
maximises sales results in stock companies, while the mutual form of organisation 
shows a preference for the internalisation of the marketing and sales function.
11
  
The above factors significantly influenced the results of the insurance companies 
present in the Spanish market. Although the figure of the free agent had prevailed from 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, with both foreign companies and national 
insurers, the turn of the century saw an exponential growth of this figure, accompanied 
by the expansion of the main branches of insurance. In particular, the first two decades 
of the twentieth century were the scenario for an intense development of the sales 
networks based on agents, where free agents or brokers continued to be the main 
elements of companies’ distribution channels.
12
 From the 1920s, however, institutional 
changes would lead to the progressive introduction of the branch system, which would 
coexist with and complement free agents during the following decades. 
                                                          
9
 Kim et al. (1996: 207). 
10
 Idem; Regan and Tzeng (1999) and Parente et al. (2010). Marvel (1982), Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Sass and Gisser (1989) have thoroughly analysed the problems between insurer and external agent 
and their impact on the insurer's cost structure.  
11
 Kim et al. (1996), Berger et al. (1997) and Cummins and Doherty (2006) carefully examine these 
relationships which characterise the ownership structure and the distribution system as strategic 
complements in the organisation of the company. 
12
 Stalson (1942, 608). Anguera de Orovio (1907), a professional of life insurance distribution, referred to 
insurance agents as ‘the main producer and lifeblood of the business of the company’. 
5 
The establishment of agencies and the hiring of agents evolved over time as the 
insurance industry became more technically sophisticated, diversified and 
professionalised. In the first stages, most companies opted for a system of independent 
agents, which afforded them great flexibility in their operations. Furthermore, as Parente 
et al. (2010) pointed out, this choice brought them a greater market share, although in 
exchange for lower profits than those obtained in a direct subscription system. 
Consequently, this was the most common system in the first stages of territorial 
expansion of both national and international insurers.
13
 During the nineteenth century 
and into the first decades of the twentieth century, insurance company agents combined 
this position with work as sales representatives and financiers working on a commission 
basis for industrial and commercial companies in other sectors. During this period, 
companies were generally specialised in a single line, which enabled a single agent to 
combine and reconcile the representation of several insurers. These agents had their 
own premises and employees and maintained a relationship with the central company 
linked to a contract in which most, if not all, of the agent’s remuneration was 
established in accordance with commissions on new policies taken out and a percentage 
for each year the insurance was continued. The distribution networks were strengthened 
by the hierarchisation among the agents in the area, who were generally dependent on a 
main representative or “delegado” in each province who was responsible for 
maintaining and managing the network of sub-agencies. The dangers of this agency 
system arose from the possibility that the main agents could direct this network in their 
own interests, on occasions contrary to the actual needs of the company (Fouse, 1905). 
In this consolidation process, Spanish legislation adapted to the changing 
realities of the insurance world in order to try to clarify and define the different 
commercial figures that existed and, above all, the tax treatment of the commissions. In 
August 1893, the Minister of Finance Germán Gamazo, in the Reglamento de la 
Contribución Industrial y de Comercio (regulation on industrial and trade 
contributions), introduced a 2 per cent payment on insurance premiums for companies, 
and the same percentage on the commissions that the companies’ agents received.
14
 
Thus, for tax purposes, agents were considered to be all those persons who procured 
subscriptions for insurance companies and who, without a fixed income, charged 
                                                          
13
 Jenkins (1984: 16-17) underlined these practices in the case of British fire offices as Phoenix, London 
& Globe, Royal Exchange or the Sun. 
14
 In Gaceta de Madrid, nº 225, of 13 August 1893, pp. 563-564. 
6 
commission for their work.  Direct employees of the companies, on the other hand, were 
those with a salary, who paid taxes according to rate 2 of the industrial contribution. 
Companies had to deduct this 2 per cent from their agents and send a quarterly list of 
the names and addresses of all their agents, with the volume of premiums subscribed 
and the commission. For their part, the agents had to register with the tax authorities in 
the province where they resided or in the province of their general representation. 
Therefore, at this time and for tax purposes, insurance agents were considered to be both 
contracted agents and brokers. 
A more precise clarification of the figure of the agent would not arrive until 
1929, when the bases of the regulation of the professional work of insurance agents 
were laid down.
15
 According to this document, natural or legal persons who managed 
insurance operations for remuneration and as intermediaries between the insurer and the 
insured were considered to be insurance managers. These were classified into two types: 
a) free insurance brokers and b) insurance agents. The former did not have a contract 
with any company, they operated freely and independently of any insurance company. 
Their main remuneration was based on lump sum or periodic commissions paid on the 
operations carried out with their intermediation. Contracted insurance agents, 
meanwhile, were those managers who were dependent on an insurance company. 
Among these, the legislation included actual agents, local or empowered 
representatives, inspectors and all those who managed insurance operations in favour of 
a firm with the corresponding appointment. Brokers had to join the official register of 
insurance brokers of the Dirección General de Seguros (Directorate General of 
Insurance) presenting a document from an authorised company that attested to the 
competence and honourableness of the applicant. With this documentation, the regulator 
would issue a licence with a photograph authorising the broker to engage in insurance 
intermediation. Agents, however, obtained their appointment, authorisation and licence 
from the insurance company, so they were able to engage in insurance operations 
without registering in the official register. Agents and brokers gradually organised 
themselves into professional associations which, to a large extent, attempted to prevent 
unauthorised persons from practising and promote the professionalisation of the 
activity.
16
 Finally, on 29 December 1934, the President of the Spanish Republic, Niceto 
                                                          
15
 In Gaceta de Madrid, nº 192, of 11 July 1929, pp. 275-277. 
16
 In 1933, there were professional associations of insurance agents in Catalonia, the Balearic Islands, 
Vigo, Seville, Soria, Toledo, Valencia, Valladolid, Ciudad Real, Cordoba, La Coruña, Guadalajara, San 
7 
Alcalá-Zamora, ratified a law establishing that the profession of Free Insurance Agent 
could not be exercised without prior registration in the Colegio Oficial (professional 
association).
17
 To this end, a provisional regulation was passed requiring the 




The maturation of the legal treatment of agents and brokers was a response, as 
already mentioned above, to the accelerated growth in the number of these actors due to 
the expansion of the Spanish insurance market. This can be seen in Figure 1, which 
shows the evolution in the number of agents registered in Spain during the first third of 
the twentieth century, along with the size of the main branches of insurance, expressed 
as total premiums collected in thousands of constant pesetas. Parallel to the growth of 
the different lines, the insurance companies’ agent networks were consolidated in Spain 
in the first third of the twentieth century, going from barely 300 registered in 1901 to 
almost 6,000 in 1932.  
 
FIGURE 1. Insurance agents registered in Spain and total premiums collected in the main 
branches of insurance, in millions of 1928 pesetas (1901, 1911, 1922 and 1932).  
 
Source: Memoria de la Dirección General de Banca, Bolsa e Inversiones, 1951, and Estadística 
sobre la Contribución de Utilidades de la Riqueza Mobiliaria, Years 1901, 1907, 1911, 1918, 
1922-23, 1928 and 1932. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Sebastián, Madrid and Zaragoza, as well as the National Association of Insurance Agents in Barcelona. In 
the Chamber of Commerce of Palencia there was a Colegio de Delegados Gestores de Seguros for 
insurance managers.  Gaceta de Madrid nº 239, 27-08-1933, p. 1344. 
17
 Gaceta de Madrid nº 1, 1-01-1935, p. 5 
18
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8 
The increase in the number of agents was a key aspect of addressing market 
expansion and the increasingly greater need to hone risk selection systems, especially in 
those branches that needed denser distribution networks. In this respect, the nature of 
the products in the life and fire branches obliged a more intensive use of this channel of 
distribution.
19
 However, far from being a uniform progression, the period from 1905 to 
1925 stands out, when the total number of agents registered in Spain multiplied 
eightfold, with growth slowing down thereafter.  
Indeed, although the chronology is not homogeneous, from the 1920s the 
networks of agents were complemented by the creation of the companies’ own branch 
offices, staffed by salaried employees, over whom the insurers had direct control. In the 
case of Spain, there were several factors that contributed to the introduction of branch 
offices in the reorganisation of the production network. Some factors were of a general 
nature, such as the above-mentioned extension of the network and the interest in 
controlling the administration costs due to the increase in administrative tasks. A third 
factor was of an institutional nature and was decisive: changes in the regulation of the 
investment of insurance companies’ reserves. The Decree of 6 April 1925 modified the 
possibilities for investing the reserves, establishing that 50% of the reserves had to be 
deposited in the Bank of Spain or in the Caja de Depósitos, 25% of which had to be 
comprised of Spanish securities. As Pons (2003) has indicated, of the remaining 50%, a 
maximum of 25% could be invested in property or mortgage loans. By allowing 
reserves to be accumulated through the purchase of property, the actual legislation 
strengthened the insurers’ interest in having their own offices in the main cities. Over 
time, many of the branches with salaried staff on the insurer’s payroll exercised control 
over the agents in their area of influence, substituting the main representative or agent.
20
 
The consolidation of denser marketing networks that were capable of locating 
new concentrations of demand led to a substantial increase in companies’ production 
costs, especially in the second quarter of the century. As Figure 2 shows, the production 
costs of the insurance sector grew across the board in aggregate terms. In the transport 
branch, the main component of production costs corresponded to the inspection of hulls 
and merchandise, both for the valuation of the insured capital and for the inspection of 
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 Direct contact with shipowners or marketing through insurance brokers, in the case of transport, made 
the insurance agent a marginal element in these lines, while in the branch of industrial accidents direct 
contracting via employers’ groups was common (Pons, 2010). 
20
 The creation of branches took place due to the need to control agents in a particular area in order to 
prevent conflicts of interests. Thus, it was possible to organise the surrounding territory on the basis of 
these branches, usually on a provincial scale in Spain (Fouse, 1905).  
9 
claims, which was reflected in the sudden increase experienced during the Second 
World War. For the other branches, however, the main component of production costs 
was related to marketing, whether commissions paid to agents or incentives paid to 
direct employees of the company. These marketing costs tripled in the cases of fire and 
life insurance and increased tenfold in the branch of industrial accidents. 
 
FIGURE 2. Production costs in the main branches, in millions of constant 1915 pesetas (1915-
1950). 
 
Source: Memoria de la Dirección General de Banca, Bolsa e Inversiones, 1951. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite this sustained increase in absolute terms of the costs borne 
by insurers, on analysing the performance of the ratio of costs to premiums collected, 
very different behaviour can be observed. As Figure 3 shows, the most significant 
change in the insurers’ cost structures affected the transport branch. Meanwhile, both 
the fire and the industrial accident branches were faced with a rise of over 50 per cent in 
their administration costs. In the case of the life branch, however, the enormous growth 
of the market enabled a gradual reduction of the production cost ratios of the insurers 
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FIGURE 3. Ratio of production costs to premiums collected in the main branches (1915-1950). 
 
Source: Memoria de la Dirección General de Banca, Bolsa e Inversiones, 1951. 
 
In view of all of the above, the effects of the spread of the agency system as a 
distribution channel and the subsequent introduction of the branch system in the 
Spanish insurance market were not uniform. Coinciding with that commented by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990), among others, the transformations in the distribution 
channels affected national and foreign stock companies and mutual societies in different 
ways. In general terms, the mutual societies tended to maintain the marketing and sales 
functions internalised, which according to theory would have resulted in generally 
lower cost ratios. This is reflected in Figure 4, in which the point clouds defined by the 
production cost ratios (horizontal axis) and the aggregate claim ratios (vertical axis) of 
insurance companies from 1915 to 1950 are represented, separated by type of company. 
In the light of the data, it can be seen that mutuals operated effectively with lower 
production cost ratios than their stock company competitors. However, they were also 
exposed to higher claim ratios than the Spanish stock companies, similar to those of 
foreign companies, a fact which poses questions about the efficiency of the risk 
selection processes implemented. 
This differential performance of the mutual societies was due to a commercial 
practice that was inherent to the very nature of this type of organisation: encouraging 
members to provide new customers for the insurance. Specifically, premium reduction 
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11 
clients were common in the Spanish mutuals. This fact was reflected in the accounts of 
the Mutual Franco Española in 1921 and the Mutua Catalana de Seguros contra 
Incendios y Accidentes Personales in 1928, which included items of this nature in their 




FIGURE 4. Dispersion map of insurance companies by type, according to their production cost 
ratios (horizontal axis) and claims ratios (vertical axis) (1915-1950). 
 
Source: Memoria de la Dirección General de Banca, Bolsa e Inversiones, 1951. 
 
Finally, although there are notable differences depending on the typology, no 
direct link can be established between production costs and claims in the terms set out 
by Parente et al. (2010), namely, that higher production costs would result in a greater 
selection of risks and structurally lower claim rates. In this case, however, no linear 
relationship between both elements can be perceived for the period in question. 
 
 
3. The creation of a network of agents for a foreign company in Spain: the Sun 
Insurance Office and Ramón Basterra 
Some of the oldest networks of agents in Spain were created by French and English 
insurers in the nineteenth century. Previously, they had created extensive distribution 
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12 
networks in their national markets. In England, Pearson (2004: 280) describes how the 
fire insurance companies’ network of agents was constructed. At the end of the 
eighteenth century, specifically in 1795, 50% of the premiums collected by the Sun 
Insurance and 56% of the REA’s were sold by agents. The Sun Insurance established its 
first agency outside London in 1710. By 1730 it had 60 agencies, and then 171 by 1800 
(Pearson, 2004: 108) 
With the international diffusion of the insurance industry around the 1880s, 
European and American companies started to establish agencies in other countries. This 
expansion was motivated to a large extent by the need to avoid the growing 
protectionist legislation, the increase of the taxes levied on foreign insurance entities, 
and in response to rising administrative expenses deriving from the growing number of 
brokers and agents without direct control in situ (Pearson and Lönnborg, 2008). In the 
case of Spain, the Sun Insurance company studied applications from candidates for 
decades, from 1836 until its decision to establish itself in Spain permanently and the 
concession of the first agency in Bilbao in 1870.
22
 
The choice of which cities to establish themselves and their agents in was an 
essential and decisive part of the growth strategy of insurance companies. A good 
choice of agencies and agents could determine the results and, as Pearson (2010a) has 
highlighted, the future success or failure in the region. The main agent in the country, as 
the leading representative of the company, made contact with the public and personified 
the company in such a way that his acts had an effect on the company itself and its 
reputation (Strudwick, 1917: 150). Thus, the activities that he had undertaken 
previously, his impeccable reputation and his family situation were just as decisive as 
his knowledge of the business and the market when it came to the insurance company 
accepting an application to establish an agency.
23
 The future agent needed to be 
familiarised with the history of the line of insurance and he also needed to be familiar 
with both the laws and the details of policies as well as agency contracts. In certain 
branches, such as in the case of life insurance, the demands in terms of knowledge of 
the particular branch were very high. The candidate to become a life insurance agent, 
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 However, as Pearson (2010b: 120-121) pointed out, the most common form of entry into the Spanish 
market for foreign companies was to sound out the market through the reinsurance of already-established 
insurers. 
23
 This was one of the indispensable requirements for the possible agents of insurance companies at any 
time and in any country. At the end of the 19
th
 century, the Nippon Life, founded in 1889, sought their 
first agents among individuals of local influence and bankers in order to build their agency network 
(Yoneyama, 2010). 
13 
for example, had to demonstrate knowledge of the elaboration of mortality tables and 
their application in setting rates for the insurance and calculating the mathematical 
reserves (Strudwick, 1917: 151-152). 
In the case of the Sun Insurance, initial contact was made with the British consul 
in Cadiz, John Macpherson Bracenburg, with whom correspondence was established, 
and who was offered an agency, but this did not prosper.
24
 After this first attempt, the 
Sun Insurance did not consider establishing an agency in Spain again until the 1860s, 
although it shared reinsurances or contracted policies directly or through co-insurance 
with other companies. Applications to establish an agency were made for Barcelona in 
the person of Guillermo Lielmal (1864); for Madrid, by Julio Vizcarrondo (1866), for 
Malaga, by Thomas Frederick Howard (1867); for Alicante and with a request for sub-
agencies in Valencia and Denia, by its agent in Bordeaux, Wigert & Prytz (1868); for 
Majorca, by F. Lizardi (1868); for Seville, by Bourcoud & Cia (1869); and for Jerez de 
la Frontera, by José G. Gordon. Extensive reports on their biography and the current 
situation in the city were demanded from all candidates, especially with regard to the 
presence of possible industrial factories with machinery, fuel deposits, forms of 
construction of buildings and the availability of a fire brigade and its functioning in the 
city. Some questions were included that focused on the matter of competition. The Sun 
demanded information on the national and foreign companies operating in the city, their 
rates and the type of policies customers in this area took out. 
These extensive reports provided the company with essential data on the 
insurance market in Spain, although in the end all the applications were rejected.
25
 After 
half a decade of analysing possibilities, finally, on 24 November 1869, an application to 
establish an agency for Bilbao was received that was eventually accepted on 9 June 
1870. The petition was accompanied by an introductory letter from R. G. Cullum, an 
agent of the Sun in Newport, Wales. The candidate, Ramón Basterra, was the 28-year-
old son of a notary born in Bilbao, who had been in England in 1858 and then 
subsequently, in 1859, had moved to Havana where he remained until 1863, the year in 
which he returned to Spain. A year later he had obtained the agency of two marine 
insurance companies: one Spanish, El Lloyd Andaluz, and the other French, La 
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 Previous experiences with agents in the British market made offices as the Sun to be cautious with the 
election of their representatives. Jones (1984: 103-105) describes the difficulties faced by the Standard. 
25
 We have the questionnaire containing a total of 26 questions presented to José G. Gordon, candidate to 
an agency in the City of Jerez de la Frontera, on 27 August 1868. Metropolitan Archives, Sun Insurance 
Company 1.31522-236, pp. 119-132. 
14 
Compagnie des Assurances Maritimes. He had two employees and connections in 
Madrid. In spite of the recommendations he presented, he was required to provide the 
same information as the previous applicants regarding the city, competition and 
established premiums. Factors in his favour included the dynamic nature of Basque 
industrialisation, an adequate knowledge of spoken and written English and his contacts 
in Madrid, who could help him obtain the licence required by law to establish agencies 
in other cities. As added value, Basterra was able to offer the existence of special tax 
laws in the Basque Country, the so-called fueros, which were more beneficial than those 
applied in the rest of Spain. 
Furthermore, Basterra’s application was attractive to the English company from 
the very start, as it was accompanied by an ambitious plan to establish sub-agencies in 
the north of Spain: Basterra’s plan was to spread out through the Basque provinces 
(Alava, Guipúzcoa, Navarre and Biscay). It is interesting to note how the applicant to be 
an agent explained the situation of these provinces to the English just before the Third 
Carlist War: “They are considered as a Republic united to Spain by a treaty and 
forming only one Province. The Spanish monarch being not our King but only what we 
called Señor (Sir). Governed as we are by special legislation we use not stamp paper 
we have not any tax upon the commerce (as there is in the rest of Spain)”.
26
 Beyond the 
Basque provinces, his proposal also included extending the network of sub-agencies to 
the commercial city of Santander, with strong links to the Basque Country. The main 
cities of this region had the advantage of being connected by a rail network and, in 
Basterra’s opinion, they were the most advanced and most peaceful cities in Spain. In 
reply, the Sun home office accepted the application to establish an agency, although it 
did so remarking that, for the time being, it would only be established in Bilbao. 
However, the Bilbao agent took barely a year to start implementing the proposed 
expansion process, inaugurating it with the opening of an agency in San Sebastián in 
May 1871. In the following years, the Sun’s man in Spain kept the company informed 
of the political and economic situation in the country and all aspects related to fire 
insurance: competition, organisation of fire-fighting teams, rates and fires that had taken 
place in the country. Likewise, after the great fire that occurred on 6 October 1880, he 
informed the head office of the cartel created in 1883 and led by the French companies 
in the fire branch: the Sindicato General de las Compañías de Seguros. The Sun 
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Insurance’s results from 1870 to 1879 are included in Table 1. In total, the activities in 
Spain resulted in more than 4,200 pounds profit. The commission was 15% for the 
Bilbao agent, a third of which Basterra paid to the sub-agents. According to accounts 
dated 27 January 1873, more than half the business was developed through sub-agents, 
who in the case of Spain were called “delegados”. 
 
Table 1. The Sun Insurance’s business in Spain through its Agent Ramón 
Basterra and the network of sub-agents (1870-1879) (in pounds sterling). 
 Premiums Expenses Losses 
1870 135 16  
1871 336 71  
1872 580 106  
1873 532 95  
1874 691 114 39 
1875 702 114  
1876 855 139 7 
1877 985 164 268 
1878 662 146 6 
1879 767 125 791 
Total 6,445 1,090 1,111 
Source: Metropolitan Archives, Sun Insurance Company 3.31522-238. 
 
After a relationship of ten years, the aspirations to extend the network of sub-
agencies to the south of Spain provoked some disagreements between the head office in 
London and the main agent in Bilbao. The reason for the dispute was basically the 
desire of the agent in Spain to expand the production network to the national level, like 
the networks designed by the French fire insurance companies operating in the country.  
The crux of this disaccord lay in Basterra’s interest in concentrating his activity in the 
fire branch, as the distribution of the marine insurance policies of the Lloyd Andaluz 
had declined in Bilbao as the result of major changes in maritime navigation, with 
sailing vessels being replaced by steamships in the fleets of the region. This aspiration 
was opposed by the prudence of the English company concerning the possibility of 
extending its agency network.  
In the first instance, the conflict revolved around the clause on commission. 
Basterra informed the head office in London that competing foreign companies paid 
their main agents a commission of 20%, and yet his company only offered 15%. This 
relatively low commission, therefore, only allowed him to offer potential sub-agents a 
percentage of 5%. The agent in Bilbao argued that it was complicated to find good 
agents with this offer of commission. If, on the contrary, he offered them 10%, like 
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other competitors, his profit margin would be reduced to 5%. Basterra considered this to 
be insufficient payment for his work, which consisted of examining all the sub-agents’ 
proposed policies and supervising the accounting of the operations as well as 
transmitting all the information from the sub-agencies to the head office. Finally, these 
arguments convinced the head office which, as an exceptional measure, increased 
Basterra’s commission to 20%, so that he could offer 10% to the sub-agents and in this 
way secure good agents for the expanded network. 
Nevertheless, the discrepancies continued for several months more, until it 
reached the point where Basterra took offence and responded that if the company 
considered that he was not doing his work satisfactorily, it should send a company 
supervisor to directly monitor the operations in Spain. The reason for conflict on this 
occasion was the intention, advocated by Basterra, to allow the sub-agents to sign 
policies directly. The company refused to consent to this request, which once again 
evidenced the opposing interests of both parties. The agent aspired to increase the 
distribution of insurance by reducing the requisites, bureaucracy and control in the 
assessment of risks while the English insurer was not prepared to yield with regard to 
the monitoring of risk selection and insisted on the final decision remaining in the hands 
of the head office. 
Greater flexibility was demanded of the Sun from Spain. Meanwhile, the head 
office sought to maintain strict standards of control over the policies sold. The main 
agent in Spain, established in Bilbao, enumerated a series of norms that he considered to 
be too rigid and which were assumed to be a hindrance to the growth of the business. 
Mainly, he criticised the amount of demands that local agents had to meet and the 
quantity of information they had to compile which were not demanded by competitors 
linked to associated risks. For example, information was required on the premises 
neighbouring those that were applying for insurance (the name and surnames and 
occupation of the neighbours, what kind of deposits they had, etc.). Furthermore, he 
complained that the Sun did not accept risk in factories, for which numerous proposals 
had been received, and moreover an additional fee was charged to businesses if they 
only occupied a quarter of the building.
27
 For their part, the Sun’s managers were not 
prepared to abandon their requirements, despite the fact that the French and Spanish 
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companies were not so demanding when it came to risk assessment. Finally, the English 
company yielded on one point and allowed businesses that only occupied a quarter of a 
building to be insured without any surcharge. 
After these months of divergence, and with the withdrawal of demands by both 
parties, the network of sub-agencies was extended. By 1881, the English insurer now 
had 11 sub-agencies (see Table 2). 50% of the premiums received as payment for the 
policies sold came from the Bilbao agency, with the next most productive agencies also 
being the oldest: those in Cadiz and San Sebastián. Reinsurance business only 
accounted for 12.5% of total premiums. In this year, reinsurance was only provided by 
the agencies in Bilbao, Cadiz, San Sebastián, Malaga, Madrid and Valencia. By 1894, 
the main agency had now been joined by 43 sub-agencies, extending the network 
throughout Spanish territory, with only four of these maintaining the same agent (Table 
3). 
 
Table 2. Result of the Sun Insurance Company’s network of agencies in Spain in 1881 (in 
reales) 
City 
Total Insurance Reinsurance (of the total) 
Sum insured Premiums Sum insured Premiums 
Bilbao 56,608,261 83,407.82 4,630,000 8,065.22 
Cadiz 17,149,444 15,332.44 300,000 150.00 
San Sebastián 23,408,400 40,419.15 1,202,000 10,002.72 
Malaga 18,056,580 21,155.02 1,800,000 2,052.90 
Gijón 2,119,100 1,904.46   
Madrid 1,830,000 1,327.00 450,000 360.00 
Santander 1,021,000 947.40   
Seville 431,000 591.46   
Vitoria 396,000 621.00   
Vigo 290,000 243.20   
Valladolid 200,000 215.00   
Valencia 160,000 106.66 1600,000 106.66 
Total Insurance 121,669,785 166,270.61 9,982,000 20,737.50 
Source: Metropolitan Archives, Sun Insurance Company 4.31522-239.  
 
In 1889, G. S. Manvell, inspector of the Sun Insurance’s Foreign Department, 
visited Spain
28
. In his report he praised Basterra’s work. He considered Basterra to be a 
person with great knowledge of the business, possessed of great business acumen, 
extremely hard working and who conducted the Sun’s business wisely and with great 
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success. Nonetheless, he expressed his concern over the Bilbao agent’s health and, with 
it, over the agency’s future in Spain. He also included a review of Basterra’s employees 
in his report, although he only had praise for Mr. Borda, a young man of 25 years of 
age, with knowledge of English and French, good manners and a capacity for 
leadership, whom he considered to be a useful and valuable man for the future. 
However, he also pointed out the failings of other employees working in inspection, 
such as a certain Mr. Conte. In the conclusions of his memorandum, Manvell 
acknowledged that the Sun’s managers were initially fearful for the business in Spain 
due to the fact that other English companies had failed. To his mind, this was because 
they did not hire adequate agents and also because the company was badly managed. 
However, they had come across an exceptional man in Basterra, prudent and blessed 
with great judgement. In his opinion, Basterra’s idea to further expand in the south of 
Spain should be followed up, and what was most important was to secure good agents, 
something that Basterra took great care about. 
In March of the same year, 1889, the inspector Mr. Conte undertook a tour of 
inspection all around Spain, visiting Ciudad Real, Cordoba, Huelva, Cadiz, Jerez, 
Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Seville, Granada, Malaga, Almería, Cartagena, Lorca, Aguilas, 
Murcia, Alicante, Valencia, Castellón de la Plana, Tarragona, Barcelona, Zaragoza and 
Logroño. During this trip, the inspector appointed 15 sub-agents in cities where there 
were none and substituted agents who were not very productive and who showed little 
interest in the Sun’s business, complaining that they only accepted small house and 
warehouse insurances while rejecting policies for factories. When he had completed his 
trip, Basterra sacked him “for taking so long to undertake his mission and for 




Table 3. The Sun Insurance Company’s agency network in 1883 and 1894 
City  1883 1894 
Main Agency 
Bilbao Ramón Basterra Ramón Basterra 
Agencies 
Algeciras  Antonio Roca 
Alicante  Pedro Pérez Pérez 
Almería R. Ledesma Hernández Antonio García Sánchez 
Avilés  Oria y hermano 
Burgos Juan García María del Rincón Dionisio Monedero 
Cadiz Salvador Viniegra Salvador Viniegra 
Cartagena  Antonio Pagan 
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Carril (León) S. Buhigas y Prats  
Castro-Urdiales  Rafael Ibáñez Maluenda 
Cordoba José Aute y Jover Rafael Giménez Serrano 
Coruña José Leira Ricardo Fariña 
Ferrol  José Caramelo 
Gijón Macario Menéndez Marcario Menéndez 
Granada Ricardo Garnier J. M. Las Heras y Cª 
Haro  Carlos Hegardt 
Irún  Plácido Ochoteco 
Jerez de la Frontera Adolfo Aguirre Adolfo Aguirre Valdés 
Laredo  Ángel Flores 
León  Fernando Díez Miranda 
Lérida  Juan Besa 
Logroño  Isidro Iñiguez Carreras 
Lorca  Domingo Muñoz 
Lugo  Emilio Piriz 
Madrid Vicente Ruíz de Velasco Liborio C. Sorset 
Malaga Guillermo Alguer Herrera Guillermo Hernáez 
Manresa  Sol Raurich y Cª 
Mataró  Julián Barbosa Arnó 
Miranda  Benito Villareal 
Murcia  Joaquín Máximo Varó 
Oviedo Miguel Fernández Figares Jerónimo Martínez 
Palencia  Albino Enríquez 
Pamplona Pablo García Abadía Casiano Díaz 
San Sebastián Gregorio Manterola Gregorio Manterola 
Santander Alberto Gutiérrez Vélez José Rodríguez López 
Segovia  Federico Larios 
Seville Manuel Le Roy Antonio Delgado 
Tarragona  José María Ricomá 
Valencia Juan Bautista Basterrechea Vicente Rubio 
Valladolid Lorenzo Cantalapiedra Ciriaco Planillo 
Vergara  Francisco Ubillos 
Vigo González y compañía Guillermo Curbera 
Vitoria Vicente Beiztegui Vicente Gil 
Vivero  Domingo Franco 
Zaragoza Juan Sancho y Serrano Pablo Gómez del Moral 
Source: Metropolitan Archives, Sun Insurance Company 4.31522-239 
 
It seems, therefore, that the key to the Sun’s success in Spain was based on the 
choice of the company’s main agent, which in turn determined a good selection of the 
distribution network. It should also be added that the balance that the Sun’s managers 
were able to maintain between the expansive ambition of their main agent and the 
prudent maintenance of a good portfolio to preserve business was also crucial. This 
control was based on strict risk selection without giving in excessively to the interests of 
the local network by accepting policies that were easier to secure, and which meant 
more commissions for the agents, but which increased the risk for the company. The 
Sun preferred a small healthy business to uncontrolled growth. This option took it to 
eighth place in the ranking of a very competitive branch in the second decade of the 
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twentieth century (Pons, 2002). The objective was not to be the leader in the Spanish 
market but rather to add to the company’s overall business. 
There are other proven cases of the vital role of the choice of a main agent for 
the success of a foreign company in Spain. The selection of Juan Angel Rosillo by the 
American insurer the Equitable Life in 1881 was decisive to its success. However, when 
his sons inherited the agency, the discrepancies and the opposing interests of the main 
agents and the head office increased. Finally, this issue, along with other general 
factors, led the American company to withdraw from Spain (Pons, 2008: 101). 
 
4. The transformations of the distribution systems in the twentieth century: 
agencies and branches in Spanish insurance 
The creation of a network of agencies was a new challenge for insurers who, as well as 
needing inspectors, had to maintain fluid channels of information with, and control 
over, the agents. The first key to expansion was the payment of commissions: a high 
commission for new policies was fundamental, both in commercial companies and 
mutuals. However, after the extension of the network, companies faced the great 
challenge of controlling risk selection, curbing administration costs and achieving a 
balance between the agents’ interests in obtaining more income and the tendency of 
insurance entities to give priority to a healthy portfolio of policies and to carefully and 
effectively assess risks in order to avoid high claims. Equidistance between both 
inclinations was not always possible, above all as the network expanded. Over time, 
national and foreign insurance companies and mutuals opted to establish their own 
branch offices run by salaried staff, which took on some administrative tasks and 
assumed control of the distribution network in their area. This decision was 
accompanied by the acquisition of property in the prestigious centres of the main 
provinces. This organisational change in the external production network had the 
incentive provided by the introduction of regulatory changes in the sector authorising 
firms to invest 25% of their reserves in property.  
 
4.1. The control of agents and the emerging branch system: the Mutua General de 
Seguros network 
The rapid growth of the Mutua General de Seguros in Barcelona from 1907 onwards 
with the aim of operating in the industrial accidents branch, for example, was based on a 
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policy of high commissions. At the first meetings of the board of directors, a 
commission of 40% on premiums for new customers was agreed for members of the 
mutual and agents who provided the company with new members. This system 
produced excellent results in the short term with regard to the extension of the mutual’s 
geographical area of influence, the increase in the number of members and expansion 
into new sectors of activity.
30
 If the first 250 companies to join the Mutua between the 
month of its constitution and 1909 are analysed, the rapid expansion of the mutual can 
be verified. Of these 250 companies, most were located in the city of Barcelona (102), 
and in Mataró (41), Reus (27) and Sabadell (16). Nevertheless, from the outset the 
founders’ intentions were to achieve an undertaking of national scope. 
 The success of its diffusion was based on the selection of its first agents and its 
stability.
31
 During the first years, the mutual expanded throughout Catalonia and also 
continued to expand nationally, mainly in the region of the Spanish Levant and also in 
some Andalusian and Galician cities. In 1916 it had agents in 30 localities all over 
Spain, most of them in Catalonia but also in Valencia, La Coruña, Las Palmas, Madrid, 
Melilla, Santander, Seville and Zaragoza. The agency network was the system used by 
the mutual until shortly before the Civil War. Under this system, agents had their own 
premises and workers who were not directly linked with the Mutua. Table 4 includes a 
list of the mutual’s main agents in1916. 
 
Table 4. Agents of Mutua General de Seguros in 1916. 
Location Agent Location Agent 
Alicante Germán Oliver Manresa Canonjía Hermanos 
Alcoy Rafael Gras Martorell Miguel Tolosa 
Badalona Ramón Perejoan Mataró Martín Fargas 
Barbastro Feliciano Carmen Malaga Domingo Fernández 
Berga Juan Rosal Melilla Jaime Roldós 
Catellfullit Vicente Pagés Olot Lorenzo Pagés 
Cee Perfecto Castro Reus Jaime Muntané 
Coruña Guillermo López Sabadell Felio Carol 
Ferrol Enrique Braguetas Santander Gregorio Cisneros 
Granada Vicente Vaquera Seville José López Jiménez 
Granollers Manuel Esquins Tarrasa Simeón García 
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Hospitales Pedro Borrás Tortosa Juan Bustos 
Logroño José Prieto Valencia Sociedad Anónima Gras 
Las Palmas Joaquín Pérez Valls Antonio Aluja 
Madrid Juan Moré Zaragoza Eduardo Ciña 
Source: Minutes of Board of Directors of 26 March 1917. 
 
Agents were responsible for hiring their own staff, channelling policy proposals 
to head office, collecting premiums and sending their income on a regular basis. This 
staff was not linked to the mutual by any more than an agent’s contract and the receipt 
of a commission. Exceptionally, the mutual paid for some improvements in the main 
offices such as, for example, installing a telephone, or took on some functions such as 
propaganda distribution by means of hiring “grooms” in some agencies with a salary of 
thirty pesetas a month.
32
 However, the administrative tasks were controlled from the 
head office, where the Mutua concentrated all its organisational operations. In 1920, the 
Mutua had 27 workers at its head office. At this time, the work in this office was 
organised into departments.
33
 The portfolio and correspondence department was 
responsible for external production and organisation. The staff of this department 
comprised a manager, two employees working as agents-producers who performed the 
work of inspectors by organising and visiting the fifty offices that the Mutua had at this 
time. Another department was for fees, with a large staff who prepared the receipts at 
the end of each quarter. In the accounts department, the current accounts of members 
were monitored and processed. The premiums collected, compensation paid and 
expenses run up were all entered in their books. In this way, the balance of each policy 
was known annually for the share out of the surplus, and also to assess the need to 
increase or, where appropriate, reduce the premium charged.
34
 
The first step taken by the Mutua General de Seguros towards the creation of 
branch offices was in 1927.  The old agent in Madrid did not meet the mutual’s 
expectations in this area. In exchange for a generous pension, an agency was created in 
Madrid with its own staff. The experience first tried out in Madrid started to spread very 
rapidly in the first half of the 1930s, accompanied by the purchase of buildings for the 
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branches being created in the process. By 1935, property had been acquired in Seville, 
Madrid and Bilbao. The development of a network of branches and the increase in 
company property was interrupted by the Civil War, and was not taken up again until 
1939. By 1942, the Mutua General de Seguros had 21 agencies and 705 branch offices, 
known as “delegaciones”, throughout Spain. These 21 agencies took on some of the 
administrative tasks, although most of these were still performed by the head office, 
which by September 1936 now had 101 employees. Of these, the only posts at 
managerial level were the director, two heads of the accident branch, a head of the fire 
branch, a cashier and two accountants. The rest of the staff were office workers except 
five typists, three premium collection agents, a chauffeur, two administrative assistants 




4.2. The case of Zurich, Hispania and Vita: the problems of shared networks  
Just as the importance of the commercial dimension stimulated companies’ efforts to 
maintain dense distribution networks, the availability of an important network of agents 
was a decisive factor in the event of takeovers or the merger of several companies. The 
acquisition of a company with an important network of agents already established 
enabled exponential growth in production in record time, although this could cause 
some managerial problems and duplications in the commercial network. This was the 
case of the company Zurich after the process of acquisition of Hispania, first, in 1915, 
and the subsequent incorporation of Vita in 1928, which resulted in a large insurance 
group equipped with a complex distribution network. 
At the start of the century Zurich, a company specialised in the accident branch, 
had granted permission for a general agency to Steiner y Gaisset, established in 
Barcelona and simultaneously a representative of the English Reliance Marine 
Insurance in the branch of marine and fire insurance. Although a network of sub-
agencies was developed on the basis of this Barcelona agency, its activity in Spain was 
very limited until 1915, when it acquired a company specialised in accidents with 
Spanish capital: Hispania. This had been founded in Barcelona in 1902 and from then 
until 1907 it established the technical basis for production and coverage in the accident 
branch. In 1905, at the management headquarters in Barcelona, the internal organisation 
had been established, made up of a legal advice service, represented by the lawyer 
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Salvador Pujadas Masó; a head of contentious matters, Luis de Mena Pita-Bado; the 
production service, whose head was Alberto Deville y Philip; an accounting service, led 
by Eugenio Preudhomme y Vidal; and a claims service, with Domingo Aldomà in 
charge. Besides these departments, there was also a statistics service, headed by Manuel 
de Villanueva y Marichalar; a reinsurance section led by Julio V. Ritter; a 
correspondence service directed by José Cordero y Gómez; a fire branch service 
(Francisco de P. Escuriet Oliver); and a treasury (Víctor Bouefvé y Dettmers), as well as 
an inspection service (see Table 5). 
Agents were sought in different parts of Spain who were part of the external 
organisation. In some cases, former agents of other companies offered their services, 
such as D.Y. de Abaitua, a former agent of La Caja de Previsión y Socorro in Bilbao, 
who was hired to mediate in the Northern Region. By 1905, general agencies had been 
set up in 34 cities, most of them provincial capitals. Besides these, there were also local 
agencies with greater density in the towns of the Catalan provinces. Meanwhile, they 
had also created main offices in Alicante, under the charge of Luis Amérigo, Aragón 
(Julio López Beo), Coruña (Enrique Rodeyro), Huelva (Mr. Roqueta and Mr. Castillo), 
Seville and Cadiz (Mr.  Natera and Mr. García Luna) and Bilbao (Durán y Cía). Given 
that the main operations were concentrated in the accident branch, there were also a 
number of assigned doctors in each main office. These agents and their staff were 
supervised by a number of regional, production, administrative and special inspectors, 
as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Inspection Service of the company Hispania in 1905. 
Post Name Area 
General Inspector Jorge Boufvé y Boissieux 
Almería, Cadiz, Cordoba, 
Granada, Huelva, Malaga and 
Seville 
General Inspector Fernando Figueras 
Extremadura, Coruña, León, 
Oviedo, Pontevedra and 
Salamanca 
Production Inspector  Jaime Millet 
Aragón, Soria, Navarra and 
Basque Provinces 
Administrative Inspector Francisco Morera  
Regional Inspector José Ordeix Province of Barcelona 
Regional Inspector Epifiano Pérez Montoya 
Alicante, Baleares, Castellón, 
Murcia, Tarragona and Valencia 
Special Fire Inspector Domingo Álvarez Sevillano  
Salary Revision Inspector Joaquín Fernández Guillen  
Production Inspector in Madrid Rogelio Macías Central Spain 
Company representative in Paris Ignacio Olarte  
Source: Memoria de la compañía Hispania de 1905, Madrid (1906). 
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With Zurich’s acquisition of Hispania, Zurich’s branch in Barcelona and the 
Spanish company were both specialised in the same branch and both had headquarters 
in Barcelona. Consequently, as from 1915 they had to coordinate their strategy and the 
functioning of their distribution networks, both internal (branches) and external 
(agents). In spite of the fact that both companies remained legally independent, a joint 
management and strategy was established, which followed instructions sent from the 
Swiss company’s head office in Zurich. This coordination was apparent in cohabitation 
in the same building, first in the Rambla de Canaletas, until 1925, in Plaza Urquinaona, 
from 1926 to 1930, and then in the Ronda de San Pedro, until the Civil War. After the 
exit of the director of Hispania, Julio Roberts, in 1920, both companies shared the 
management and the highest executive posts. From 1920 to 1923, Conrado Siegfried 
maintained his dual position as CEO in Hispania, as well as managing director of both 
companies. In 1923, Jorge Boeufvé and Marco Cusa were appointed as directors of 
Hispania, and also of Zurich branch.
36
 The management was centralised in Barcelona, 
where salaried company employees performed the work of issuing policies, control and 
payment of claims and other administrative tasks. This basically constituted the internal 
organisational structure. 
The external organisation was in the hands of a network of agents created in 
most of Spain during this period, supervised by territorial inspectors. The regions with 
the greatest presence initially, after Catalonia, were Andalusia, Aragón, Valencia, 
Galicia and the Basque Country. Many of these agencies were occupied successively by 
members of the same family.
37
 This was the case, for example, of the family in charge 
of the agency in Bilbao. The agency was established by Ignacio de Abaitua in 1905, and 
had been linked with Hispania since that time. The founder was succeeded by his son 
José María and in 1952 it was still represented by the same family in the person of 
Salvador Guinea, grandson-in-law of Ignacio. In most cases, agents combined the 
procurement of policies with other types of work, and they were often employed by 
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Table 6. Hispania’s Network of Agents 1903-1933 (permanently linked and having been linked 
with the company for over 30 years in 1952). 
Name Year City Province 
Autonomous 
Community 
Tocón Ayala, José 1918 Jerez de la Frontera Cádiz 
Andalusia 
 
Ferrer Guerrero, Manuel 1924 Granada Granada 
Cueto Martínez, José 1931 Porcuna Jaén 
Rodríguez Bellver, Rafael 1932 Almonte Huelva 
Martin Castaño, Teruel 1924 Teruel Teruel 
Aragón Valentina Luna, Vda. de Catalán 1928 Caspe Zaragoza 
Blesa Azanza, José y Fernando 1929 Zaragoza Zaragoza 
Ochoa Lavandera, Nicolás 1918 Gijón Asturias 
Asturias 
González Crespo, Wenceslao 1926 Luarca Asturias 
Llop Pelegrí, Pablo 1928 Palma de Mallorca Balearics Balearics 
Pirez Bethencourt, Alfredo 1923 Las Palmas Gran Canaria Canaries 
Zumelzu, Antonino 1903 Santander Cantabria Cantabria 
Román Del Pozo, Ramón 1922 Daimiel Ciudad Real Castile-La 
Mancha Moraleda Hidalgo, Francisco 1929 Toledo Toledo 
Martin, Diego 1923 León León 
Castile-León Aguado Losada, Jesús 1932 Palencia Palencia 
Vidal Cesteros, Teófilo 1932 Valladolid Valladolid 
Celma Comas, Juan Bautista 1918 Tortosa Tarragona 
Catalonia 
Plana Mañé, Pedro 1918 Vendrell Tarragona 
Tresserras Auli, Rafael (from 1933) 1922 Olot Gerona 
Vidal Camaposada, Antonio 1928 Calaf Barcelona 
Vives Pascual, Juan 1928 Badalona Barcelona 
Montaner Beltrán, Jaime 1930 Villanueva y Geltrú Barcelona 
Valls Torrens, Pablo 1930 Villafranca del Panadés Barcelona 
Fabregas Santacana, Jaime 1931 Igualada Barcelona 
Mitjavila Llorens, Agustín 1931 Santa Coloma de Farnés Gerona 
Salvat Canela, Miguel 1932 Martorell Barcelona 
Delmuns Dulcet, Ramón and Caralt 
Comerma, Ramón 
1933 Manlleu Barcelona 
Delmuns Dulcet, Ramón and Caralt 
Comerma, Ramón 
1933 Vich Barcelona 
Bosshard Moesch, José 1906 Valencia Valencia 
Valencian 
Community 
Vilar Miralles, Javier 1923 Castellón Valencia 
Planells Cuevas, Nicolás 1928 Requena Valencia 
Casto Redondo, Badajoz 1929 Badajoz Badajoz Extremadura 
Rodeyro Moñino 1922 Santiago de Compostela La Coruña  
Galicia 
 
Llorens Ebrat, José and Julio 1931 La Coruña La Coruña 
Vda. De Pio S. Carrasco 1932 Villagarcía de Arosa Pontevedra 
Camara Cerrada, Celso 1932 Haro La Rioja La Rioja 
Martinez Angosto, José 1921 Murcia Murcia Murcia 
Abaitua y Compañía (Guinea, Salvador 
–Grandson of Ignacio de Abaitua) 




Barcaiztegui y Martin de Villarragut, 
Vicente  
1930 San Sebastián Guipúzcoa 
Calceran Boeufvé, Alejando 
    
Source: Hispania Compañía General de Seguros, 1902-1952, pp. 23-32. 
 
The productive activity of these agents was controlled and they received advice 
from territorial inspectors. Thus, while these inspectors were travelling they fulfilled the 
role of connecting agents with Hispania and the Zurich branch office in Barcelona. 
These inspectors, paid employees of the two insurers, met regularly with both 
companies and received a salary and a series of commissions depending on the 
production of the province or provinces that were under their supervision. 
However, control of the agencies and their portfolios was not always easy. The 
complexity of this supervision can be seen in correspondence between the branch in 
Spain and the general management at the head office in Zurich in 1935. The 
management in Zurich had a project aimed at reforming the control carried out by 
inspectors and, through them, increasing their control over the agencies. Its objectives 
included establishing a closer inspection of each agency by means of the inspectors 
collecting key information from each of them. In the project, in order to increase the 
authority over the network, a new type of file was proposed in which the following 
information was requested: a) production of the inspector, total pesetas by branch; b) 
the agency’s portfolio; the number of policies in force and c) for cancellations, the total 
amount of pesetas. However, those responsible in Spain responded to the central 
management arguing that compiling these data would complicate the agencies’ tasks. In 
the letter of reply, the current procedure that was followed to prepare the financial 
statements, the portfolio and the cancellations was explained. Up until this time, the 
financial statements were prepared through the involvement of several agencies, but 
only the operations and pesetas produced by each inspector were appraised. With regard 
to the agencies’ portfolios, since 1933 calculating the amount had been done on the 
basis of “premiums created”, which included the annual policy increases and from 
which the policies lapsed during the year were deducted. To appraise the inspector’s 
work, managers in Spain proposed that, in order to know the increase or decrease of 
policies in an agency or area, production could be compared with cancellations. In this 
way, the increase or decrease of the portfolio could be assessed and the results of the 
work of each inspector would be obtained. 
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On 15 January 1936, the Zurich management met almost all of the inspectors in 
Barcelona in order to exchange knowledge and ideas, in the style of modern 
brainstorming in today’s companies. The meeting was attended by both old and new 
inspectors, as well as potential candidates being considered by the company. Some of 
the surnames can be known from the summary of the meeting: Parrizas, Riera, Nater, 
Heck, Gracia, García, Bustos, Rodríguez and Olivella. This meeting was held at a time 
of strong competition from the employers’ mutuals, whose creation rocketed when 
industrial accident insurance became compulsory in 1932-33. The central topic under 
discussion concerned the need to convince potential clients of the mutuals’ internal 
problems and the risks of taking out coverage with them, concentrating on their low 
levels of solvency and their administrative shortcomings. Additionally, other matters 




The progressive integration of the distribution networks of Zurich and Hispania 
proved to be one of the group’s most important assets in the medium and long term. 
When Zurich’s subsidiary in the life branch, Vita, joined the group in 1927, it took 
advantage of this network, and this was a determining factor in its early growth.
40
 
However, during the first years it was operating, the company ran into certain 
difficulties that those running the company considered could not be justified by the 
economic depression of the 1930s, as they were of the opinion that the crisis in Spain 
was not so severe. 
In this situation, those running the company tried to encourage its agents to 
make the most of the competitive advantages that the company Vita had with respect to 
competitors in the Spanish market. Noteworthy among these advantages were: a) the 
influx of new policyholders; b) the profit participation clause, which was paid from 
1928 onwards with an interest guarantee (in this year they had been promised 14% 
interest on the premiums and they had been given 15%); c) a securities portfolio with a 
yield of 5.25%; d) organisational costs were covered by a fund of 1.5 million Swiss 
francs paid in by shareholders; e) the technical resources were the most modern 
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 Zurich Archive. 1935-1943 Spain-Inspectores, Zurich Archive 36183-1. 
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 The company VITA was created on 22 December 1922. Its main shareholder was the company Zurich, 
Compañía General de Seguros contra los Accidentes y la Responsabilidad Civil. It was granted a federal 
concession on 23 April 1923. Thanks to the initial help from the collaborators of the parent company and 
then with the creation of its own organisation it expanded its activity and established itself in a 
considerable number of countries. In 1933, its internal organisation comprised 260 employees, including 
the general management in Zurich and its diverse branches abroad. Its external organisation was made up 
of some 250 professional agents and more than 1,300 free agents (Pons, 2015). 
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available (calculators and accounting and statistical machines) and enabled a relatively 
small number of staff.
41
 The agents’ motto should be “promise little and accomplish 
much”. However, one of the main problems in this line was the percentage of portfolio 
terminations, which was higher in Spain than in Germany or Switzerland. These 
differences obliged the Swiss head office to demand greater supervision of agents in 
Spain, who could act irresponsibly by accepting policies that were highly unlikely to be 
continued over time and tolerating practices of procuring premiums in order to collect 
the commission for new policies, as Pons has commented (2015: 115). 
Prior to the Civil War, the need for greater control of agencies through the way 
that their production network was organised was already discernable. Whether this was 
to be through a reorganisation of production or through a reorganisation by regions and 
areas by means of delegaciones or branch offices with the companies’ own staff, the 
objective was to implement a structure that would protect and favour the company’s 
interests by reducing administration and transaction costs while avoiding a lack of 
control over agents. With time, by now in the mid-century, a further objective arose, 
which was to decentralise some of the administrative functions that had traditionally 
been performed by the internal organisation of the companies at their head offices. 
 
5. Conclusions 
From the first stages of development of the insurance industry, the choice of the system 
of distribution has always been a strategic decision with profound effects on the 
company’s results. Whether it was through the use of agents or through the company’s 
own branches, the density and the extent of the distribution networks determined the 
capacity of insurers to connect with the different centres of demand and to choose the 
insurable risks of developing economies. 
In the Spanish case, the dispersion of the demand and the relative backwardness 
of insurance with respect to other markets magnified the importance of distribution 
strategies, to the extent that it became a determining factor in the success or failure of 
insurers. Indeed, from the late nineteenth century onwards, the development of a 
network of agents accompanied the main branches of insurance and enabled their 
growth. Meanwhile, the growing importance of these networks had direct repercussions 
on the cost structure of companies, who found it necessary to assign increasing 
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 El noticiero de VITA (newspaper sent exclusively to VITA agents//representatives), no.2 of May 1931. 
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resources to the control of their agents. In this context, insurers opted for different 
solutions: mutual societies chose to promote the role of members as potential 
distributors of their products whereas, in view of the changes to the legislation 
regulating investments, many companies favoured the creation of their own branch 
offices in order to reduce production costs and maximise the return on their reserves. 
Although other instruments were used to sound out the market, the entry of 
foreign companies into Spain and their long-term results were closely dependent on the 
agents they chose to organise their representatives in the country. In the case of the Sun 
Insurance Office, after a long search for a representative for the country, the work of its 
agent in Bilbao, Ramón Basterra, proved to be fundamental to the company’s expansion 
in Spain. Furthermore, in spite of conflicts between the head office and the agent and 
their diverging interests, the strategy of specialising in the fire branch and of expanding 
into the entire territory proposed by Basterra ended up determining the success and the 
continuity of the company in the Spanish market. 
The introduction and spread of the branch system throughout the first third of the 
twentieth century added complexity to the distribution networks. In the Mutua General 
de Seguros, the creation of its own branch offices was intended to be a way of reducing 
the costs of controlling the company’s distribution network, while at the same time 
underpinning territorial expansion to other regions of Spain. In the case of the Zurich 
group, the shared use of Hispania’s sales network and the combination of agents and 
branches enabled the productivity of the network to be maximised and facilitated the 
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